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LEGAL ETHICS: STANDARDS FOR WHOSE SAKE?
In its Preamble, the ABA's Canons of Professional Ethics state
some basic premises for their own existence. "In America, where
the stability of Courts and of all departments of government rests
upon the approval of the people, it is peculiarly essential that the
system for establishing and dispensing Justice be developed to a high
point of efficiency and so maintained that the public shall have
absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its administration."' It is more important that the ethical restrictions presently
in effect promote such efficiency and respect for the system of
justice in the minds of all the people than merely to preserve the
rules themselves intact.
In recent years, the public has developed several methods of providing adequate legal services. For the most part, strong objections
to these plans have been lodged by the organized bar on the basis of
the traditional interpretations of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
The canons prohibiting solicitation, intervention of lay intermediaries,
and stirring up of litigation are most often cited as reasons for restricting the plans. Glorification of the canons is not desirable when
such glorification operates to the disadvantage of both the public
and the practicing bar. It is asserted that revision of the canons
can facilitate the orderly provision of legal services while at the same
time give attorneys standards that are both meaningful and profitable
to them as professionals. "[B]roadening the availability of legal services by encouraging new forms of group representation might well
serve to increase the financial security of lawyers practicing at the
lower levels of the bar, thereby strengthening their capacity to conform to ethical norms."2
Professional standards are not designed to be understood by laymen; but when a practice that is reasonable to the layman is contrary
to ethical standards, the burden is on the ethical rule to show its
3
virtue. "It is not met by a mere reiteration of a rule."

1.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL

OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 1 (1957) [hereinafter cited as OPINIONS or CANONS]. (Emphasis added.)
2. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 181 (1966).
3. Schwartz, Foreword to Group Legal Services in Perspective, 12 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 279, 283 (1965).
ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES WITH THE CANONS
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GROUP LEGAL SERVICES AND THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY:
THE PUBLIC SEARCHES FOR A LAWYER

In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia
State Bar,4 respondent sued to have certain practices of the Brotherhood enjoined on the grounds that they constituted the solicitation
of legal services and the unauthorized practice of law in that state.
The Brotherhood maintained a department of legal counsel in
sixteen regional divisions. Each division gave legal advice to Brotherhood members and recommended particular attorneys who, in its
judgment, were especially qualified in handling plaintiffs' cases in
railroad personal injury suits.
The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen was formed in response to
the hazardous nature of the members' work and their need to band
together for protection. 5 Yet, even after the passage of the Safety
Appliance Acts and the Federal Employers Liability Act,7 the employees did not have sufficient protection against the practices that
railroads used to avoid proper payment of just claims:8
Injured workers or their families often fell prey on the one
hand to persuasive claims adjusters eager to gain a quick and
cheap settlement for their railroad employers, or on the other
to lawyers either not competent to try these lawsuits against
the able and experienced railroad counsel or too willing
to settle a case for a quick dollar.
In addition, the railroads have the ultimate weapon in this battle,
the right to discharge an employee. This right plus the mere threat
of discharge can effectively be used to dissuade employees from pursuing just claims. This fact was implicitly recognized in the case
of In re Heirich.9 There, the court took judicial notice "that in
Federal employers' liability cases settled without counsel, 97% of the
employees returned to work for the railroad; while if suit was filed,
from 80% to 96% of such employees lost their jobs."10
The nature of the railroad business enhances the possibility for the
employer to abuse the trainman's ability to properly litigate or settle
his claim. His job often consumes twenty-four hours a day, seven

4.

377 U.S. 1 (1964).

5. Id. at 2.
6. 27 Stat. 531 (1893), 45 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1964).
7. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §§51-60 (1964).
8. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
377 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1964) (footnotes omitted).

9.

10 IIl. 2d 357, 379; 140 N.E.2d 825, 836 (1957).

10. Ibid.
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days a week; he is out of touch with the community in which his
"residence" is located; and lawyers whom he would contact would
probably not be as competent in this area of the law as the railroadhired adversary." Thus, the trainman is greatly hindered in his
attempt to obtain adequate legal counsel.
Speaking for the majority of the United States Supreme Court
in Brotherhood, Mr. Justice Black emphasized the plight of railroad
workers and their widows in seeking compensation for their losses.
The legal program of the Brotherhood was an attempt to solve this
dilemma, and the activity was found to be protected by the first
amendment:12
The right of members to consult with each other . . . neces-

sarily includes the right to select a spokesman from their number who could ... give the wisest counsel .... And the right of

the workers personally or through a special department of
their Brotherhood to advise concerning the need for legal
assistance - and, most importantly, what lawyer a member
could confidently rely on - is an inseparable part of this constitutionally guaranteed right to assist and advise each other.
In essence, Mr. Justice Black's opinion turned on his determination that the needs of individual litigants should be fulfilled, even
if the fulfillment of such needs required modification of existing ethical standards. This holding is not startling in light of the Court's
earlier decision in NAACP v. Button." In that case, the right of the
NAACP to persuade its members and nomembers to bring litigation
was recognized. The association was also allowed to supply counsel as
part of its plan to advance the cause of civil rights through judicial
proceedings.
The Court's decisions in Brotherhood and NAACP rested on the
first amendment's protection of the right to associate freely. In
NAACP, the Court noted that association for litigation is probably
the most effective form of political association for the NAACP. Although the reason for association in Brotherhood is not "political,"
the first amendment does not so limit its protection. Within the
purview of the first amendment's associational right is the privilege
of members of an association to freely advise each other. Such a right
may be restricted only upon the showing of a "compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional
11.

Bodle, Group Legal Services: The Case for BRT, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 306,

308 (1965).
12.

Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377

U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
13.

371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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power to regulate .... ,,14The Supreme Court noted that the State
of Virginia was attempting to curtail the activities of the Brotherhood's legal department on the basis of the state's powers to halt
commercialization of the legal profession. In this case, the state's
interest in regulating the professional conduct of attorneys was not
sufficient to justify the infringement of the trainmen's right to be
fairly represented in law suits. By emphasizing the individual's need
for effective legal representation, the Supreme Court has declared
that the time has come for a change within the legal profession.
Before the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Brotherhood
the practice of maintaining a legal aid department constituted apparent violations of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Particularly
involved are those canons dealing with solicitation, 15 stirring up liti-

14. Id. at 438.
15. CANON 27, which governs solicitation, reads: "It is unprofessional to
solicit professional employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by
personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations. Indirect advertisements for professional employment such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection
with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner
of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, offend the traditions and lower
the tone of our profession and are reprehensible; but the customary use of
simple professional cards is not improper.
"Publication in reputable law lists in a manner consistent with the standards
of conduct imposed by these canons of brief biological and informative data is
permissible. Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement
of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone number, cable addresses; branches of the profession practiced; date and
place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended, with dates of graduation,
degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented. A certificate of compliance with the Rules and Standards issued by
the Special Committee on Law Lists may be treated as evidence that such list
is reputable."

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol19/iss2/7
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gation, 16 and intervention of lay intermediaries.1 Apparently the
Supreme Court in NAACP and Brotherhood has substantially altered
the traditional meaning of these canons. The precise activity that
has been condemned in opinions of the American Bar Association' is
now protected under the first amendment.
Congress has also recognized the need to extend legal services to
all economic classes. The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)
has created the Neighborhood Legal Services Project under the
authority of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,11 which provides
for granting federal funds to local programs. The purpose of this
project is to provide assistance to "community action programs"
that assist in the elimination of poverty.20 This plan contemplates
the active participation by nonlegal personnel in finding those who
need legal help and channeling those in such need to local law
offices supported by OEO funds. Those who oppose this project
16. CANON 28 prohibits stirring up of litigation: "It is unprofessional for a
lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of
blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and
litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is
disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform
thereof in order to be employed to bring suit or collect judgment or to breed
litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having
any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ
agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly,
those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attachgs or others
who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek
his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon
every member of the Bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of
any practitioner immediately to inform thereof, to the end that the offender
may be disbarred."
17. The prohibition against intervention of lay intermediaries is contained
in CANON 35: "The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or
exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between
client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual.
He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or
in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be
personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. Charitable societies
rendering aid to the indigent are not deemed such intermediaries.
"A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an association, club or trade organization, to render legal services in any manner in which
the organization, as an entity, is interested, but this employment should not
include the rendering of legal services to the members of such an organization in
respect to their individual affairs."
18.
19.

OPINIONs 8, 10, 56, 57, 98.
78 Stat. 508 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §2701.
20. See Korosec, Legal Ethics and the Poverty Program, 15 CLEV.-IfAR. L.

REV.

225, 230 (1966).
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criticize this active advertising, or "running," as an intervention of
lay intermediaries. Critics say that the traditional attorney-client relationship cannot exist under this arrangement. The client has been
actively solicited, told by a layman that he has a legal problem, and
sent to the neighborhood OEO legal office for free advice. This
type of activity has been disapproved because no potential sanction
of disbarment protects the public against the fraud of the intermediary, the confidential attorney-client relation is disrupted, control
of the litigation might be exercised by the intermediary, and a conflict of interest is likely to exist. It is said that a lawyer's relation
to his client must be strictly personal, and that his responsibility
should be direct and not subject to interference by lay intermediaries.21
It should be noted, however, that once the client is directed to
him, the OEO lawyer is able to maintain the traditional lawyer-client
relation contemplated in canon 35. He also remains independent to
handle the problem on its merits. 2 2 The questionable aspects of the
OEO plan arise in the manner in which the indigent reaches the
OEO lawyer.
The OEO attorney is part of a sociological team that seeks to
attack and remedy the causes of poverty. The assumption is: "[T]he
poor must be trained to participate regularly in the critical decisions
affecting their lives if they are to break out of the cycle of proverty
23
This training must relate to the effect the law has upon the
[SiC]."
lives of all people, including the poor. Because the financial consequences of decisions involving legal relations are relatively small
does not diminish their importance to the individual making that
decision. The relative effects are equally beneficial or disastrous.
In terms of the traditional interpretations of the Canons of
Ethics, however, the activities of the OEO apparently constitute solicitation, intervention of lay intermediaries, and stirring up of litigation. 24 What is viewed as charitable legal education25 on the one
hand is denounced on the other as ethical impropriety. The ultimate
question regarding the OEO, and the group legal service plans in
Brotherhood and NAACP, should be: Does the lawyer's role as a
professional in modern America include participation in a groupfinanced program that actively seeks disadvantaged people in order to
solve their socio-legal problems?
The plans in Brotherhood and NAACP have been approved by
the United States Supreme Court, and the OEO plan is even less ob21.

CANON 35, note 17 supra.

22. See Korosec, supra note 20, at 225.
23. WALD, LAW AND POVERTY: 1965, 3 (1965).
24. See OPINIoN 8.
25. CANON 35, note 17 supra.
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jectionable. Regarding the problem of intervention of lay intermediaries, proponents of the OEO and group legal services compare
these plans to the legal aid programs that have been in operation for
years, and interpret them to be within the exception in canon 35
that: "Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigent are not
deemed ...intermediaries. ' '26 The sanction against lay intermediaries
is based on the assumption that a lawyer's responsibilities and quali2 7

fications should be individual..

Unlike the OEO lawyer, the lawyers in NAACP and Brotherhood
are more apt to feel a responsibility to the interests and requests of
the organization as opposed to the client. The NAACP lawyer's retainer is not paid by his client and the admitted purpose for the
28
sponsored litigation is to advance the political cause of civil rights.
Only when the client's claim has a strictly civil rights basis can the
lawyer be certain that his employer's interests (NAACP) are not divergent from those of his nominal client. Similarly, the solicitation activities 29 are more questionable in Brotherhood and NAACP than under
the OEO plan. The OEO lawyer works on a salary basis, which does
not necessarily make it to his advantage to handle a larger number of
cases. The NAACP lawyer and the Brotherhood lawyer, on the other
hand, work on a retainer or on a contingent fee basis, which means
that any solicitation is to their financial advantage. From the point
of view of the evils that the solicitation canon attempts to eliminate,
the OEO plan is more acceptable.
SPECIALIZATION:

A METHOD

OF INFORMING LAYMEN WITHIN

THE SPIRIT OF THE CANONS

The role of a professional must be defined within the context
of the society in which it operates. The canons, which attempt to
regulate the ethics of the practicing bar, were formulated in the context of late nineteenth-early twentieth century America.3 0 With
particular reference to the canons prohibiting solicitation, stirring
up of litigation, and lay intermediaries the tremendous societal
changes have eliminated the justifications upon which these canons
were based.
In a predominantly nonurban society, the existence of lawyers and
their capabilities were considered to be well known in the community.31 It was further assumed that membership in the bar quali26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Ibid.
Ibid.
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419 (1963).
See CANON 27, note 15 supra.
See Costigan, The Canons of Legal Ethics, 21 GREEN
Schwartz, supra note 3,at 288.
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fled a lawyer to competently handle all legal problems that might be
presented by a wide variety of clients. 3 2 A corollary to this idea is

the assumption that the lawyer would refer any client whose case he
could not handle to a more qualified fellow attorney.33 Of course,
the layman must be able to identify his legal problems as such and
realize that a lawyer is necessary to resolve them satisfactorily. 34 It
is maintained that none of these assumptions are now valid.
In our highly urbanized and complex world the particular skills
and traits of all the lawyers are not generally known. If one is fortunate enough to realize that a legal problem exists, the methods available to choose a lawyer qualified to handle a particular problem are
highly unsatisfactory. One must "consult" either the telephone directory or the local lawyer referral service or rely on acquaintances to
locate a lawyer.3 5 These alternatives involve too great an element of
chance that the lawyer selected will not be properly qualified. The
prospective client's chances of success are slight because the necessary
information for selecting a competent lawyer is not provided. Ideally,
a layman should be. able to determine which lawyers are competent
in a given specialty, and, among those, which particular lawyer is
the most competent. It is recognized that the profession cannot
undertake to publicly list lawyers by degrees of competency. On the
other hand, the orderly segmentation of the law into specialty areas
and the implementation of minimum proficiency requirements within these areas would be a great aid to the laymen in his search for
the proper attorney.35
Currently, dassification into specialities is condemned by the canons as advertising.3 7 Justification for the present operation of canon
27, which prohibits most forms of advertising,38 is not purely historical.
There are certainly some practical reasons for adherence to its proscriptions. It is said: 35

32.

Elson, The Canons of Ethics and the Providing of Legal Services, 33

TENN. L. REv. 171 (1966).

33. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 290.
34. Elson, note 32 supra.
35. See, e.g., OPINIONS 4, 7, 105A, 107A, 244, 249, 291, 295.
36. American Bar Association Special Committee on Recognition and Regu-

lation of Specialization in Law Practice, Report (1963); Cantrall, A Country
Lawyer Looks at "Specialization," 48 A.B.A.J. 1117, 1118 (1962); Habermann, Preventive Law-A Challenge to the Bar, Wis. B. Bull. Aug. 1966, p. 7.
37. CANON 27, note 15 supra; OPINIONS 145, 175, 183.
38. See, e.g., OPINIONS 11, 69, 121, 123, 159, 207, 260.
39. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Murrell, 74 So. 2d 221 (1954); In re Rothman,
12 NJ. 528, 97 A.2d 621 (1953); DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 212 (1953); Note, Solicitation of Clients and Advertising by Attorneys, 9 DRAKE L. REv. 102, 110 (1960):
Note, Advertising, Solicitation and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. REv. 677, 678 (1954).
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(1) that advertisements, like other forms of solicitation, tend
to stir up litigation in contravention of public policy;
(2) that without the restrictions of canon 27, the least ethical
and least capable lawyers would publish extravagant material
about themselves, and that the resulting harm would fall on those
least able to afford it;
(3) that lawyers would hold out assurances of success to the
client which could not be realized and thereby increase the lawyer's
temptation to engage in illegal conduct to secure the ends desired
by the client;
(4) that conduct which commercializes the practice of law
tends to lower the profession in the public confidence;
(5) that bargain counter methods on the part of lawyers would
lower the whole tone of the administration of justice.
None of the foregoing reasons for prohibiting advertising appears
to be a foreseeable consequence of the recognition of legal specialization. The equally desirable goal of permitting the layman to make
an informed decision when he chooses an attorney would seem to outweigh these possible evils. The system that the medical profession
employs to certify its members as specialists in certain fields has been
most successful. It is doubtful that the medical profession has been
injured by the adoption of this system, and the public itself is better
prepared to choose a doctor.40 Undoubtedly, the legal profession
could benefit from similar certification in specialties.
The establishment of a system of specialties would encourage the
practice of referring clients when referral is appropriate. As it now
operates the system leaves to the lawyer's complete discretion the
decision to refer a client to another attorney, regardless of either
lawyer's competence. 41 Implicit in this system is the danger that the
decision to refer the client will be based on grounds other than the
client's own best interests. While the existence of specialties would
not completely eliminate this danger, it would substantially decrease
the lawyer's opportunity to make arbitrary referrals.
RULES Or PRorESSIONAL CONDUCT: How ARE THEY SERVING
THE PRACTICING BAR?

Since the date of the formulation and adoption of the Canons of
Professional Ethics in 1908, America has undergone a process of
growth and resocialization. The increase in population has been

40. Niles, Ethical Prerequisites to
A.B.A.J. 83, 84 (1963).
41. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 290.

Certification of
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explosive. The industrial revolution has produced a tremendous
flow of goods, and a great number of institutions have sprung up
to distribute the wealth. Labor is highly specialized, and the population has moved together to form huge urban centers and metropolitan complexes. These changes have had a marked effect upon the
way law is practiced.
The ratio of lawyers to total population has been increasing. In
1951 there were 221,605 lawyers, or one for every 696 persons. In
1963, the number had risen to 296,069, or one lawyer for every 637
persons. The most drastic change, however, has been in the form of
practice. Although the total number of lawyers has increased, the
number of solo practitioners has steadily declined since 1955. In
that year, 127,389 lawyers practiced alone, while in 1964 the number
had decreased to 113,127.42 Despite this decline, solo practitioners
still comprise over half of the total number of approximately 200,000
practicing attorneys. 43 During the same period, the number of lawyers
44
practicing as partners has risen from 54,966 in 1955 to 70,064 in 1964.
In recent years this trend to practice in partnerships has been accelerating.45 The number of associates in partnerships has also increased in recent years, which is a further indication of the trend
46
away from solo practice.
The incomes of lawyers who practice alone compared with those
who practice in partnerships might indicate an economic reason for
this shift in form of practice. On the average, the partnership lawyer
earns from 3,000 to 5,000 dollars more per annum than does the lawyer who practices alone. 47 Also, partnerships more readily allow
specialization within the firm. Economic surveys indicate that lawyers
who specialize earn more than general practitioners. 48
Economic independence seems to have a high correlation to strict
adherence to traditional interpretations of the Canons of Professional
Ethics. Jerome Carlin's surveys of the Chicago and New York City
Bars are graphic authority for this statement. 49 Mr. Carlin concluded
that the stratification of the bar has a great effect on the ethical
tendencies of any particular level within the bar.50 Generally, the
42. Hankin & Krohnke, The American Lawyer: 1964 Statistical Report 26
(1965).
43. American Bar Association Committee on Economics of Law Practice,
Economic Facts About Law Practice (1966).
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS (1966); CARLIN, L wYERs ON THEm OwN (1962).
50. CARtN, LAWYERs' ETnics 166-82 (1966).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol19/iss2/7
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"large-firm" lawyer is more successful financially and is more able
to withstand temptation to violate any of the canons than is the
individual practitioner, who is much more in need of money. According to Carlin the canons call for two types of norms: those that
proscribe behavior considered immoral and unethical by society
generally, such as bribery, 51 stealing,52 and cheating;5 3 and those that
deal with strictly professional standards, including conflicts of interest,5 4 methods of obtaining businessp9
and relations with
clients. 56 The more general standards are accepted by most lawyers,
while the distinctively professional standards are widely accepted
only by the "elite" lawyers.
The large firm versus individual practitioner is not the only important factor in this contrast. On the contrary, this is the only one of
three elements that Carlin points up in his analysis of deviant behavior. Aside from these situational inducements to violate the
ethical norms, the lawyer who does violate them must have the
proper inner disposition to do so and his behavior must be reinforced
by his peers. Thus, the young lawyer in a small firm or in individual
practice is exposed to more opportunities to deviate, and the pressure
on him to do so is greater due to economic factors, meaning that he
is also more vulnerable to such persuasion. As he becomes skeptical
of his chances for success, he will tend to attribute his failure to the
restrictive character of certain norms and seek to avoid them. Feeling
twinges of regret about any such action, or having second thoughts,
this lawyer seeks the opinions of his peers who have the same problems
and have likely felt the same need to justify their behavior. Thus,
the process of violation is facilitated and substantiated among this
group of lawyers. Finally, there is much room to question whether
the young lawyer has been effectively inculcated with the professional
norms. What is his inner disposition toward the behavior proscribed
by the canons? The problem here is said to be one of "late socialization. ' ' 5 Professional conduct is supposedly governed by a distinct
set of norms, some in line with those of society and some in contrast.
The professional is seen as having certain unique characteristics:
lack of concern for monetary gain and dedication to the service of
others. These are viewed as products of socialization into a professional subculture. When viewed as such, a process of resocializa51.

CANONS

1, 3,15, 29, 41.

52.

CANONS

11, 15, 29, 41.

53.

CANONS

10, 11, 12, 15, 29, 41.

CANONS 6, 7, 10.
55. CANONS 27, 28.
56. CANONS 4, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 30, 31, 32, 35, 37, 41, 44.
57. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 176 (1966).
54.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 7

1966]

NOTES

tion becomes important to internalize these unconventional norms.
It is highly doubtful whether such a basic change in norms can be
wrought at a late stage of the individual's development over a relatively short period of time.5s
If these theories are correct, the young law graduate who is not
employed by a large secure firm is turned into the world at a great
disadvantage. What aid and solace does he derive from the canons
and his training in legal ethics? Carlin's findings indicate that whatever exposure he may have is too little and too late, regardless of
his good intentions.
The young lawyer's tendency to feel that the canons cannot be
taken too literally can only be strengthened by the manner in which
they are enforced. While it is said that the hallmark of a profession
is its right to govern itself,59 the low percentage of violators who are
processed and sanctioned 60 puts the effectiveness and importance of
the policing function in serious question. The chances of the lawyer
suffering from his unethical conduct, except as his conscience may
treat him, is highly unlikely. Without effective internalization of
ethical norms, the conscience cannot be expected to handle the job
effectively. The function that formal controls are to perform is
highly questionable.
Thus, the social stratification of the bar tends to weaken and
undermine the practicing bar at the lower social strata. This stratification also accounts for the wide range in quality of legal services
that different clients receive. The most affluent members of society
have the most highly trained, specialized, ethical lawyers. The lower
income individuals are represented by the least competent and least
ethical lawyers. The paradox is that the latter are greatly in need
of the best legal representation and are the least likely to get it.
From the perspective of the practicing attorney then, the canons
fail to accomplish their stated objectives. Rather than insuring:
"[T]hat the system for establishing and dispensing Justice be developed to a high point of efficiency" 6' 1 the canons contribute to its
inefficiency. It should be recognized that the inculcation of professional standards may not be accomplished by the mere exposure
of third-year law students to canons that are realistically suited to
conditions that existed over half a century ago. If young lawyers
are to perform in a professional manner, they must be guided and
restricted by professional norms that are more meaningful and
58.

Ibid.

59. Allen, Goals of Professional Discipline, 57 FLA. BAR J. 374, 379 (1963).
60. The statistics indicate that only 2% of the violators are processed and
only 0.2% are officially sanctioned. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETmcs 170 (1966).
61.
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realistic to them.

Currently, canons that seem

unrealistic are

avoided and transgressed with impunity.62 They are often an unmeaningful hindrance to the practicing lawyer and seldom guide
him in the conduct of his professional activities. 63 Under the
present operation of the canons, is it not reasonable to think that
the only real function performed is to forestall public criticism of
the profession rather than to regulate the profession and to punish
all violators? While violations of the professional norms are more
widespread than violations of normal community standards, the
former are far less likely to be punished than the latter. This
emphasis on normal morality rather than on professional ethics
seems to accent the "overriding concern of the organized bar for its
public image."64
CONCLUSION

The Canons of Ethics, though rich in tradition and history, fail
in their objectives of serving both the profession and the public.
The advent of group legal service plans (NAACP and Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen) and the Neighborhood Legal Services Project
of the OEO manifests the demand by the public for competent legal
services. The problem is to supply competent legal counsel to fill
the needs of those who are unable to intelligently seek out and employ
an attorney. For the layman the problem arises in several forms: (1)
the inability to recognize legal problems as such; (2) the ignorance
of the relative cost and value of legal services; and (3) the difficulty in
locating a competent lawyer.65 For the lawyer, the canons impose
impractical restrictions on the one hand and fail to provide realistic
guidelines for his professional behavior on the other.
At a time when large numbers of people are in need of legal advice, and a great segment of the profession is in need of clients,66 it
seems anachronistic that the professional code of ethics should keep the
two classes apart. The canons are formed for the purpose of keeping
the system of justice operating at a high peak of efficiency and maintaining the public confidence in that efficiency. 67 This purpose, how-

ETHICS

62.
63.

AND

GRIEVANCES

WITH

THE

CANONS

OF

PROFESSIONAL

ETHICS

1

(1957).

CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 165 (1966).

Crabites, Our Maleficient Legal Ethics, 1

186-93 (1937)

NATIONAL

LAWYERS

found in SELECTED READINGS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION

64.

CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS

65.

WALD,

GUILD

Q.

91-98 (1962).

170 (1966).

op. cit. supra note 23.
66. Carlin, Will Poverty Program Empoverish Lawyers?, 24
GUILD PRACTITIONER 132, 134 (1965).
67. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Op. cit. supra note 61.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

NATIONAL LAWYERS

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 7
1966]

NOTES

ever, is not served by keeping those in need of justice so completely
isolated from the only realistic means of obtaining it.68 Nor is the
profession served when its members must violate the canons to reach
these same people who need such services.
The continued expansion of new forms of group representation,
therefore, could benefit both the public and the bar. Such plans
could enhance the financial position of lawyers who are presently
in the lower strata of the bar, thus decreasing their tendency to violate
ethical norms. "If this requires altering certain canons of ethics,
then let it be done, since it would permit a genuine improvement of
ethical conduct in the bar. The effective extension of legal services
is thus entirely consistent with, if not an indispensable condition for,
strengthening the moral integrity of the legal profession." 69 The plea
for more available legal services by the mass of people should be interpreted by the legal profession as a challenge requiring the articulation of its role in our society. What we are dealing with is no
longer a problem of mere interpretation of legal ethics. Rather, it
is a question of fulfilling our duty to the public to provide legal
services to all those who need them.
KARL B. BLOCK, JR.
MICHAEL McGILLICUDDY

68. In the October 1966 edition of Law in Action (Volume I, No. 3), Mr.
Justice Abe Fortas is quoted as saying: "[J]ustice without lawyers is not a practical
possibility. The provision of lawyers for people who are involved in legal problems is essential. It is basic democracy to provide lawyers to those who need legal
services and who cannot afford to pay the fee."
69. CARrIN, LAWiYas' ETHIcs 181 (1966).
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